network agent
Tuna Desktop registers org.gnome.Shell.NetworkAgent on the system bus. Requests
are accepted only from NetworkManager's current unique bus owner. A newer
request or CancelGetSecrets dismisses the old prompt and invalidates its
pending asynchronous helper work.
The shell asks for WPA/SAE and WEP secrets, 802.1X identity/password hints, PEAP/TTLS/FAST passwords, TLS private-key passwords and mobile broadband PINs. Existing identities remain read-only when NetworkManager did not ask for them. Certificate files, trust roots, EAP method selection and a new enterprise connection's initial configuration stay in Settings, as in GNOME 51's network agent.
VPN prompts use the installed NetworkManager plugin's GNOME authentication
helper with --external-ui-mode. Tuna Desktop sends connection data and secrets
through stdin, reads the plugin's version 2 keyfile, and displays its title,
description and requested fields. It returns the nested VPN secrets
dictionary including supplied noninteractive values. Plugins without this
external-UI capability are reported as unsupported; legacy plugin-owned
windows are not implemented. Helpers have a 30 second deadline.
Agent-owned user secrets use libsecret's secret-tool and the same
connection-uuid, setting-name and setting-key attributes as GNOME's
ShellNetworkAgent.
Secret values travel through stdin/stdout and are never command arguments
or shell logs. System-owned and always-ask secrets are not stored. Requests
without ALLOW_INTERACTION reuse stored values; REQUEST_NEW ignores stored
passwords. SaveSecrets and DeleteSecrets use the same keyring attributes.
The session needs an unlocked Secret Service provider such as GNOME Keyring;
a missing provider or failed store returns an error rather than claiming
that a user secret was remembered.
When NetworkManager lists several wired adapters, the Wired menu gives each interface an expandable submenu. A single adapter keeps the direct connection rows. Changes follow NetworkManager device and property signals.
When NetworkManager reports a captive portal on the activated primary
connection, the shell posts "Sign in to Network" as GNOME 51 does;
activating it calls org.gnome.Shell.PortalHelper.Authenticate on the
session bus. That helper ships with gnome-shell (gnome-shell-portal-helper,
D-Bus activated). When the name is not activatable the shell logs once
and offers nothing.
The GTK proof adds G-NM-ENTERPRISE, G-NM-VPN and G-NM-WIRED: a real
private GNOME Keyring stores, reuses and deletes an agent-owned EAP password;
a TLS request asks for its key password; a VPN helper supplies the external
UI prompt and checks the secrets reply; and a second wired adapter adds
separate submenus. The NetworkManager daemon side is a D-Bus stub. These
proofs do not establish successful authentication against physical 802.1X
infrastructure or a live VPN server.