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network agent

Tuna Desktop registers org.gnome.Shell.NetworkAgent on the system bus. Requests are accepted only from NetworkManager's current unique bus owner. A newer request or CancelGetSecrets dismisses the old prompt and invalidates its pending asynchronous helper work.

The shell asks for WPA/SAE and WEP secrets, 802.1X identity/password hints, PEAP/TTLS/FAST passwords, TLS private-key passwords and mobile broadband PINs. Existing identities remain read-only when NetworkManager did not ask for them. Certificate files, trust roots, EAP method selection and a new enterprise connection's initial configuration stay in Settings, as in GNOME 51's network agent.

VPN prompts use the installed NetworkManager plugin's GNOME authentication helper with --external-ui-mode. Tuna Desktop sends connection data and secrets through stdin, reads the plugin's version 2 keyfile, and displays its title, description and requested fields. It returns the nested VPN secrets dictionary including supplied noninteractive values. Plugins without this external-UI capability are reported as unsupported; legacy plugin-owned windows are not implemented. Helpers have a 30 second deadline.

Agent-owned user secrets use libsecret's secret-tool and the same connection-uuid, setting-name and setting-key attributes as GNOME's ShellNetworkAgent. Secret values travel through stdin/stdout and are never command arguments or shell logs. System-owned and always-ask secrets are not stored. Requests without ALLOW_INTERACTION reuse stored values; REQUEST_NEW ignores stored passwords. SaveSecrets and DeleteSecrets use the same keyring attributes. The session needs an unlocked Secret Service provider such as GNOME Keyring; a missing provider or failed store returns an error rather than claiming that a user secret was remembered.

When NetworkManager lists several wired adapters, the Wired menu gives each interface an expandable submenu. A single adapter keeps the direct connection rows. Changes follow NetworkManager device and property signals.

When NetworkManager reports a captive portal on the activated primary connection, the shell posts "Sign in to Network" as GNOME 51 does; activating it calls org.gnome.Shell.PortalHelper.Authenticate on the session bus. That helper ships with gnome-shell (gnome-shell-portal-helper, D-Bus activated). When the name is not activatable the shell logs once and offers nothing.

The GTK proof adds G-NM-ENTERPRISE, G-NM-VPN and G-NM-WIRED: a real private GNOME Keyring stores, reuses and deletes an agent-owned EAP password; a TLS request asks for its key password; a VPN helper supplies the external UI prompt and checks the secrets reply; and a second wired adapter adds separate submenus. The NetworkManager daemon side is a D-Bus stub. These proofs do not establish successful authentication against physical 802.1X infrastructure or a live VPN server.