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Security

Supported Versions​

Corral is pre-1.0 and ships from main plus tagged releases. We give security fixes only to the most recent release. If you use an older tag, upgrade to the latest release first. The fix lands there.

Reporting a Vulnerability​

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Instead, report them privately through GitHub Security Advisories:

  1. Go to the Security tab
  2. Click Report a vulnerability
  3. Give a detailed description, with steps to reproduce, affected backends, and the corral version output

You can expect:

  • Acknowledgment within 48 hours
  • Status update within 5 business days
  • Resolution timeline based on severity

We follow coordinated disclosure. You report privately, and we investigate and fix. We publish the advisory after we release the fix.

Security Model​

Corral manages VMs across backends (local QEMU, KubeVirt, Incus, libvirt, Proxmox VE) and exposes guests over your Tailscale tailnet:

  • Secrets stay local. Cloud-init passwords live in the registry file (~/.local/share/corral/registry.json, mode 0600). Corral passes no Tailscale auth key to guests; the Tailscale operator holds its own. For backend tokens, use environment variables such as CORRAL_PROXMOX_TOKEN. Then your credentials stay out of dotfiles repos.
  • No client-side K8s SDK. Corral runs kubectl and virtctl for cluster work. Thus Corral uses your local kubeconfig and never keeps cluster credentials itself.
  • Tailnet trust. Guests on the tailnet get the ACLs of your tailnet. Treat exposed ports (corral port-proxy and per-VM Services) as tailnet surface, not LAN surface.
  • Web UI access. On a workstation, corral web uses the cluster credentials of the operator. Limit who can reach its listen address. In a cluster, the corral-web service account uses the RBAC in deploy/. That ClusterRole grants only the verbs that the code uses.

Scope​

In scope: the corral binary (CLI, TUI, corral web), backend clients under pkg/, and the release workflows that build them.

Out of scope: vulnerabilities in guest OS images and in upstream projects (QEMU, KubeVirt, Incus, Proxmox VE, Tailscale). Operator infrastructure (cluster RBAC, tailnet ACLs) is also out of scope. But tell us when the defaults of Corral make those worse.