Security
Compass runs third-party extensions behind a sandbox, keeps clipboard history and extension credentials, and can type into other windows. Please report vulnerabilities privately.
Reporting a vulnerability
Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead:
- Open the Compass security advisories page.
- Describe the problem, including:
- the affected component (engine, extension host, sandbox, Rhai scripts, clipboard history, input server, platform integration, packaging)
- the Compass version and how it was installed (Flatpak, Homebrew, AppImage, Arch, Nix, source)
- the smallest steps that reproduce it
- the impact (sandbox escape, credential or clipboard leak, privilege escalation, and so on)
- a suggested fix, if you have one
What to report
- Sandbox escapes: an extension worker reaching files outside its Landlock boundary, or a kernel interface its seccomp filter denies.
- Extension privilege escalation: an extension running a host program without being granted it, or reaching another extension's storage, preferences or tokens.
- Rhai script permissions: a script doing something its
script.tomldoes not declare, or that you did not grant. - Credential leaks: OAuth tokens, extension passwords or the clipboard history key stored or sent anywhere they should not be.
- Clipboard history: concealed (password manager) copies being recorded, or the history being readable without its key.
- Input server:
compass-input-serverholdsCAP_DAC_OVERRIDEto read keyboards and type snippets. Anything that lets another program drive it, or read keystrokes through it, is in scope. - IPC: another local user, or a sandboxed extension, issuing engine commands it should not.
- Supply chain: tampered release artifacts, Flatpak or Homebrew packaging that grants more than it should.
Out of scope
- Vulnerabilities in upstream projects: Vicinae, the Raycast API, Iced, Node.js, GNOME, KDE, wlroots compositors, systemd, D-Bus, the kernel. Report those to their maintainers. If Compass uses an upstream component in a way that makes it exploitable, that is in scope.
- Third-party extensions from the Extension Store or the Raycast Store. Report those to the extension's author, unless the extension gets past the sandbox, which is in scope.
- Anything that needs the attacker to already run code as you outside the sandbox.
- X11 sessions. Compass is Wayland-only.
What to expect
We aim to acknowledge a report within 5 business days and to confirm whether we can reproduce it within 10 days. A fix ships in a normal release, and its release notes and a GitHub security advisory describe it. We prefer coordinated disclosure: please wait until a fixed release is out before publishing details. Tell us in the report if you would like to be credited.
Security model
The sandbox is defense in depth. It confines buggy and overreaching extensions well; a determined attacker with a kernel exploit can still escape it.
- Filesystem: each extension worker runs behind Landlock and sees only its own data, the
extension runtime and system paths. In
$HOMEit may read only the few files the allowlist names (for example~/.ssh/config, never the keys). - Syscalls: a seccomp denylist refuses interfaces no extension needs, such as
ptraceand module loading. It is a denylist because the worker is Node, whose syscall use changes between releases. It also refuses Unix-domain sockets (socketpairstays allowed for a child's pipes), so a worker cannot reach the session bus, the engine's IPC socket or any other local service, and the worker is started with a short allowlist of the engine's environment, without the bus, display or agent addresses. - Memory: each worker is capped at 256 MiB by
MemoryMaxin its own systemd scope, with each JavaScript heap capped at 160 MiB below that. Where no systemd is reachable (inside the Flatpak)RLIMIT_DATAholds it at 512 MiB of committed memory. The caps are not configurable per extension. - Host programs: an extension runs a program on the host, such as
brew, only if Compass's own overrides list names that program for it, and only after asking you: Allow Once, Always Allow or Deny. An extension cannot add a program to that list itself. See the Raycast compatibility notes. Rhai scripts declare what they need inscript.toml. Scripts you install yourself get nothing until you allow it the first time you open them; the scripts Compass ships are granted what they declare. The Script Permissions command lists and revokes these grants. See the Rhai scripts guide. - Updates: Compass checks its own releases and tells you when a newer one is out. It never installs anything; your package manager does that.